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sufficiency of statutorily prescribed notice provided in
connection with pending judicial proceedings, and not
constructive notice of new legislation, where due process
considerations are different. Cf. Chamberlin v. United States,
664 F. Supp. 663, 664 (N.D.N.Y. 1987); Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454
U.S. 516, 537-536 n.33 (1982). They accordingly have no
relevance here. In any event, the central premise of
petitioner’s argument--that the numerous cross-references
delineating the statutory basis for Tax Court jurisdiction in
interest abatement cases are unduly opaque--is not well founded.
Section 6404(i) expressly incorporates section 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii),
which in turn is specifically referenced in (current) section
7430(c)(4)(D). Such cross-referencing and incorporation are not
unusual in the Internal Revenue Code and hardly raise due process
notice concerns. For the foregoing reasons, we find that the
jurisdictional requirements for abatement of interest cases do
not offend due process.
Finally, petitioner argues that imposing a net worth
limitation on a party’s right to Tax Court review of denials of
interest abatement is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the U.S. Constitution because there is no rational basis for
establishing a net worth threshold in a suit challenging the
respondent’s failure to abate interest.
However, “In areas of social and economic policy, a
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