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first two categories to be of minimal value in making the
comparison. He determined that the “L.S. Malachinski” signature
on the consent document was most similar to the last of these
three categories. He concluded, however, that he could not
determine whether the signature on the consent was genuine. His
inability to do so was based upon his determination that the
three signatures in the third category were “not enough of a
representative sample of the writer for me to make any
determinations.”
The testimony of expert witnesses may be helpful to the
Court in determining factual controversies. We are not bound by
an expert’s opinion, however, and we may accept or reject such
testimony when, in our best judgment, based on the record, it is
appropriate to do so. Thus, while we may choose to accept an
expert’s opinion in its entirety, we may also be selective in the
use of any portion of that opinion. See Seagate Tech., Inc. v.
Commissioner, 102 T.C. 149, 186 (1994).
The reports of the experts in this case are inconsistent--
Ms. Marsh believes that the exemplars suffice to show that
petitioner did not execute the questioned signature, and Mr.
Davidson believes that the exemplars do not permit such a
conclusion. Taking both opinions into account, and having
scrutinized the documents ourselves, we are not convinced that
the signature at issue is a forgery. Thus, petitioner has failed
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