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immediately. That did not happen. The conduct of petitioner and
his advisers is thus plainly inconsistent with the claim that the
consent was forged. See Kim v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-
142; Eddins v. United States, 71 AFTR 2d 93-795, 93-1 USTC par.
50,027 (S.D. Miss. 1992), affd. without published opinion 9 F.3d
103 (5th Cir. 1993).
Other circumstances support our finding. Typewritten
portions of the power of attorney to Messrs. Ostrand and Mack
indicate that petitioner and Wynne had contacted them on or
before May 23, 1983. The consent was executed on June 1, 1983,
and 10 days later petitioner and Wynne both signed the power of
attorney. We think it unlikely that Wynne would forge
petitioner’s signature to a document extending the statute of
limitations for 1980, and then, 10 days later, cooperate with him
in hiring advisers to represent them for that very year. In such
circumstances, her duplicity would have been too easily
uncovered.
Additionally, in April of 1984, petitioner, at the urging of
his advisers, paid $20,400 to the IRS with respect to his and
Wynne’s 1980 taxable year. Petitioner made this payment after
the period of limitations for that year would have expired,
unless there were in effect a valid waiver. Competent
professionals would not advise a client to make a payment with
respect to a tax liability which could not be collected.
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