Estate of Richard R. Simplot - Page 44




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          by voting and nonvoting stock is essentially irrelevant to any              
          difference in value between those shares.13                                 
               Mr. Much concluded that no difference existed in the per-share         
          value (i.e., voting rights premium) between J.R. Simplot Co.'s              
          class A voting and class B nonvoting shares primarily because the           
          class A shareholder could not extract economic benefits.  Mr. Much          
          believed that even if a difference existed, it was negligible.              
          However, he testified that, on the basis of the available data, and         
          everything being equal, he would not "quibble" with valuing                 
          decedent's class A voting shares at approximately 5 percent more            
          than decedent's class B nonvoting shares.  In his opinion, this             
          premium would not be based on economics but rather on a "feel good"         
          basis for having the right to vote.  Nevertheless, Mr. Much opined          
          that any premium for the feel-good right to vote would be offset by         
          the liquidation preference in favor of the class B nonvoting shares         
          and the right of first refusal encumbering the class A voting               
          shares.                                                                     
               Finally, Mr. Much determined that the discount for lack of             
          marketability of the stock would range from 10 to 40 percent of his         
          determined marketable minority value.  After reviewing several              
          restricted stock studies, and giving consideration to the 360-day           
          restriction placed on the class A voting stock,  Mr. Much concluded         
          that a 35-percent discount for lack of marketability was                    

               13   In analyzing the 14 transactions discussed above, Mr.             
          Much determined that the ratio of outstanding voting shares to              
          total shares outstanding ranges from 9.8 percent to 92 percent              
          and is not correlated with a voting premium.                                

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