Estate of Richard R. Simplot - Page 70




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               We agree with respondent that                                          
                    The key to acquiring control of Simplot is the Class              
               A shares.  The investor would likely pay large premiums                
               (in cash or stock) to induce the Class A shareholders to               
               relinquish control.  Once a majority interest of the                   
               Class A shares is obtained, the investor could force a                 
               merger into another company.                                           
               *       *       *       *       *       *       *                      
                    The disparate ratio of nonvoting to voting stock in               
               this case is particularly important because it                         
               dramatically increases, on a per share basis, the value                
               of the Class A shares. * * *  When there are very few                  
               voting shares, as here, the result is a huge increase in               
               the per share value of the voting rights associated with               
               the Class A shares.  Simplot's extreme ratio of nonvoting              
               to voting shares--1,848.24 to one, with only                           
               approximately 76 voting shares--magnifies the per share                
               premium by a thousand times or more compared to any                    
               company with a typical single digit ratio.                             
               Dr. Spiro opined that the amount of the collective voting              
          premium should equal 10 percent of J.R. Simplot Co.'s equity value.         
          Mr. Matthews selected a lesser amount.  He stated that an amount            
          ranging from 7 percent (on the high side) to 3 percent (on the low          
          side) of the equity value would be a "fair" collective premium for          
          the voting privileges.                                                      
               We recognize that on the valuation date the hypothetical buyer         
          of decedent's 18 shares of class A voting stock would not have the          
          ability to control the Company's management and would be subject to         
          the philosophy of the other three class A shareholders, all of whom         
          were related and had family interests to protect.  And obviously,           
          an investor would pay more for a block of stock that represents             
          control than for a block of stock that is only a minority interest          




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