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punish the defendant for his offense but to compensate the
plaintiff for his injuries").
Petitioner observes that the South Carolina Supreme Court
has stated repeatedly that punitive damages may also be awarded
to "vindicate a private right" and that this vindicative quality
adds a compensatory purpose. See, e.g., Harris v. Burnside,
199 S.E.2d 65, 68 (S.C. 1973); Hughey v. Ausborn, 154 S.E.2d 839,
844 (S.C. 1967)(Brailsford, J., concurring); Hicks v. Herring,
144 S.E.2d 151, 155 (S.C. 1965); Rogers v. Florence Printing Co.,
106 S.E.2d 258, 261 (S.C. 1958); Mock v. Atlantic C. L. R. Co.,
87 S.E.2d 830, 840 (S.C. 1955); Davenport v. Woodside Cotton
Mills Co., supra at 743; Hull v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 57 S.E.
28, 29 (S.C. 1907); Beaudrot v. Southern Ry., 48 S.E. 106, 107
(S.C. 1904); Griffin v. Southern Ry., 43 S.E. 445, 447 (S.C.
1903); Watts v. South Bound R.R., 38 S.E. 240, 242 (S.C. 1901).
By virtue of these statements, petitioner concludes, punitive
damages are compensatory in nature under South Carolina law. We
disagree. We do not understand the South Carolina Supreme Court
to have used the verb "vindicate" to mean "compensate". See
Shuler v. Heitley, 39 S.E.2d 360, 361-62 (S.C. 1946); see also
Clark v. Cantrell, supra at 609. See generally 22 Am. Jur. 2d
Damages secs. 3, 23-24, 731, 733 (1988) (different functions of
compensatory and punitive damages). As we understand the court's
use of the latter verb, it describes the ultimate effect of
punitive awards as a form of remedy. To this end, we have found
no case where the South Carolina Supreme Court has used the verb
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