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punitive damages are meant to punish the defendant, or to deter
or stop him or her and others from similar conduct in the future,
and (3) the ability of the wrongdoer to pay. See Gamble v.
Stevenson, supra at 354; Hicks v. Herring, supra at 155; Fennell
v. Littlejohn, 125 S.E.2d 408 (S.C. 1962). The fact that South
Carolina law measures an award of punitive damage by the
financial status of the wrongdoer, see South Carolina Farm Bureau
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Love Chevrolet, Inc., 478 S.E.2d 57 (S.C. 1996);
McCourt v. Abernathy, 457 S.E.2d 603, 608 (S.C. 1995); Gamble v.
Stevenson, supra at 354; Reid v. Kelly, 262 S.E.2d 24 (1980);
Hicks v. Herring, supra at 155, adds to our belief that a
punitive damage award under that law is tied directly to
inflicting punishment upon the defendant, rather than
compensating the plaintiff for his or her loss. South Carolina
law also provides no formula under which punitive damages are to
be measured, leaving the amount of a punitive damage award up to
the judgment and discretion of the jury, subject, of course, to
the power held by a trial judge to change the jury's verdict.
See Gilbert v. Duke Power Co., 179 S.E.2d 720, 723 (S.C. 1971).
The amount of the award, therefore, lacks any direct nexus to the
extent of the personal injury suffered by the plaintiff on
account of the defendant's wrongdoing.
Nor do we agree with petitioner's argument that the trilogy
of O'Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79 (1996), Commissioner v.
Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995), and United States v. Burke,
504 U.S. 229 (1992), should be applied only prospectively.
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