Dixie Van Aernam - Page 20




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                4. The value of the consideration received by the debtor              
                    was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset               
                    transferred.                                                      
                5. The debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly               
                    after the transfer was made.                                      
                6. The transfer occurred shortly before or after a                    
                    substantial debt was incurred.                                    
          Fla. Stat. sec. 726.105(2)(a), (d), (e), (h), (i), (j),                     
          respectively.  An additional factor is whether the transfer was             
          disclosed or concealed.  See Fla. Stat. sec. 726.105(2)(c).                 
                We can draw no inferences from the third and fifth                    
          factors, since respondent has failed to prove that the transfer             
          was of substantially all of Steven’s assets or he was insolvent.            
          In petitioner’s favor is the fact that the transfer was disclosed           
          (a public record was made on August 3, 1995).  The remaining four           
          factors (the four factors), considered only in light of the                 
          stipulated facts, could support a finding that Steven’s actual              
          intent was to defraud any creditor:  The transfer was to Steven’s           
          wife, after he had been indicted on the drug charges, shortly               
          before Steven incurred a large fine, and apparently without                 
          Steven’s receiving consideration of reasonably equivalent value.            
          The stipulated facts, however, are not the only light in which to           
          consider the four factors.  There is also petitioner’s testimony.           
                Considering petitioner’s testimony together with the                  
          stipulated facts, we surmise that the following led up to                   
          petitioner’s sale of the Pelican Avenue property (altogether, the           






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