- 20 -
4. The value of the consideration received by the debtor
was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset
transferred.
5. The debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly
after the transfer was made.
6. The transfer occurred shortly before or after a
substantial debt was incurred.
Fla. Stat. sec. 726.105(2)(a), (d), (e), (h), (i), (j),
respectively. An additional factor is whether the transfer was
disclosed or concealed. See Fla. Stat. sec. 726.105(2)(c).
We can draw no inferences from the third and fifth
factors, since respondent has failed to prove that the transfer
was of substantially all of Steven’s assets or he was insolvent.
In petitioner’s favor is the fact that the transfer was disclosed
(a public record was made on August 3, 1995). The remaining four
factors (the four factors), considered only in light of the
stipulated facts, could support a finding that Steven’s actual
intent was to defraud any creditor: The transfer was to Steven’s
wife, after he had been indicted on the drug charges, shortly
before Steven incurred a large fine, and apparently without
Steven’s receiving consideration of reasonably equivalent value.
The stipulated facts, however, are not the only light in which to
consider the four factors. There is also petitioner’s testimony.
Considering petitioner’s testimony together with the
stipulated facts, we surmise that the following led up to
petitioner’s sale of the Pelican Avenue property (altogether, the
Page: Previous 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011