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The record here leaves much to be desired.8 Nevertheless,
stipulated facts and exhibits confirm petitioner’s testimony that
the deposit was received from her, John Richards paid a portion
of the purchase price of the property, and none of the purchase
price came from Steven. We think the following to be fair
inferences from the record, and we so find: Petitioner
contributed her own money to the Pelican Avenue transaction. She
contributed that money on her own behalf; she did not make a loan
to Steven. John Richards and petitioner’s father-in-law likewise
contributed their own moneys in their own interest (and not as
loans to Steven). Steven contributed no money, but, nonetheless,
8 In part, that may be due to the fact that respondent
waited until the start of the trial to add Fla. Stat. sec.
726.105(1) (actual intent to defraud or lack of fair
consideration) to Fla. Stat. sec. 726.106(1) (insolvency) as the
basis for his claim that the Pelican Avenue property was
fraudulently transferred to petitioner. While respondent must
have believed that he could prove fraudulent intent from the
stipulated facts, petitioner appears to have been caught off
guard by that addition to respondent’s claim. Our review of
petitioner’s direct testimony convinces us that she had given no
consideration to the relationship between the stipulated facts
and the elements of the fraudulent intent claim. No doubt, that
is because, until the start of the trial, respondent’s trial
memorandum had not informed her of that claim. Her direct
testimony was principally in rebuttal to the claim that Steven
was insolvent. Indeed, much of the testimony from which we
construct the Pelican Avenue transaction came during respondent’s
cross-examination of petitioner. In part, we accord her
testimony credibility because of its spontaneous nature.
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