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affd. in part and remanded in part without published opinion 679
F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1982), found that the taxpayer, who relied on
Rev. Rul. 190, supra, to support the deductibility of his
transportation expenses was not entitled to such deductions
because he had not established that the work sites at issue were
outside the general area of his principal or regular place of
employment.3 We thus found, without determining whether the jobs
were temporary, that the taxpayer was not entitled to deduct
transportation expenses. See Harris v. Commissioner, supra.
In the present case, petitioner points to our finding in
Norwood v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 467 (1976), as support for her
position that the temporary nature of her employment is
sufficient in and of itself to entitle her to deductions for
commuting expenses. Our disposition of Norwood, however, was
based on the parties’ framing of the issues; thus the sole focus
of our inquiry was whether the employment was temporary. See id.
at 469. Petitioner also relies on respondent’s position in Rev.
Rul. 60-189, 1960-1 C.B. 60. Rev. Rul. 60-189 is irrelevant to
petitioner’s case as it concerns expenses incurred while
3 Dahood v. United States, 747 F.2d 46, 48-49 & n.4 (1st
Cir. 1984), indicates that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit remanded Harris v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1980-56,
affd. in part and remanded in part without published opinion 679
F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1982), because it questioned whether the
evidence supported our findings of fact and not because the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the two-prong
test as a matter of law.
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