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liability.”
Respondent bears the burden of proving his entitlement to a
partial summary judgment. See Rule 121(b); Jacklin v.
Commissioner, 79 T.C. 340, 344 (1982). The factual materials
presented and the inferences therefrom must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See
Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); United States
v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). Petitioner argues
respondent has not provided either evidence or explanation that
shows petitioner’s statutory warranty liabilities are not fixed
by statutes, such as the U.C.C., Magnuson-Moss, and State “lemon
laws”. Petitioner places reliance on United States v. Hughes
Properties, Inc., 476 U.S. 593 (1986), for the proposition that
statutory liabilities satisfy the first prong of the all events
test. Petitioner states: “It is well settled that if a liability
is fixed by statute, it is fixed under the first prong of the All
Events Test.”3 We find petitioner’s reliance on United States v.
Hughes Properties, Inc., supra, and other cases4 cited to be
3Petitioner uses the term “statutory liability” to refer to
liabilities arising from statutes or regulations promulgated
pursuant to a statute.
4Petitioner also cites: United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S.
422 (1926) (involved a statutory liability that arose upon the
profitable sale of munitions); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. United
States, 717 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1983); Wien Consol. Airlines,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 528 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1976), affg. 60 T.C.
13 (1973); Denise Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 930 (3d Cir.
1959), revg. 29 T.C. 528 (1957); Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Commissioner, 114 T.C. 293 (2000) (a portion of the liability
fixed by State regulations met the first prong); Ohio River
(continued...)
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