John S. Halpern - Page 14




                                         - 14 -                                          
          the plastic recyclers, the parts of the agreement are in harmony.              
          This seems to us to be the more logical reading of the language                
          in the preamble, and, notwithstanding Mr. Kamerman’s testimony,                
          it probably was what was intended by the parties.  Cf. Overhauser              
          v. United States, 45 F.3d 1085, 1089 (7th Cir. 1995).                          
               In sum, we do not find that there was a misrepresentation of              
          a material fact, and, under section 7121(b)(2), we may not set                 
          aside or disregard the closing agreement.  Furthermore, we find                
          that petitioner is bound by Provizer v. Commissioner, supra,                   
          under the closing agreement.7                                                  
               Respondent also filed a motion for an award of a penalty                  
          under section 6673.  That section provides, in relevant part,                  


               7  At trial, petitioner raised the argument that the closing              
          agreement should be set aside because petitioner allegedly did                 
          not receive a prior offer that was more favorable to him than                  
          that which resulted from our Provizer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.              
          1992-177.  The theory apparently was that this amounted to                     
          malfeasance under sec. 7121(b), or at least it was on that theory              
          that the Court allowed examination of the witnesses on that                    
          issue.  Petitioner has not argued this point on brief, and it is               
          deemed conceded.  See Burbage v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 546, 547                
          (1984), affd. 774 F.2d 644 (4th Cir. 1985); Wolf v. Commissioner,              
          T.C. Memo. 1992-432, affd. 13 F.3d 189 (6th Cir. 1993).  Aside                 
          from the so-called TEFRA partnership provisions (see secs. 6621                
          through 6234 and on point sec. 6224(c)(2)) that do not apply                   
          here, there is nothing in the Internal Revenue Code that requires              
          that an offer to one taxpayer be extended to other taxpayers.                  
          Moreover, it should be noted that there was a patent                           
          inconsistency in petitioner’s argument that Mr. Fisher’s alleged               
          misrepresentation was to a material fact and petitioner’s                      
          insistence that he was entitled to an alleged settlement based                 
          upon other Plastics Recycling cases.  The latter argument must                 
          assume that he was entitled to the offer because the cases were                
          substantially identical.                                                       





Page:  Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  Next

Last modified: May 25, 2011