James W. and Laura L. Keith - Page 18




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               described property, and said parties of the second part                
               shall not be liable for any deficiency arising from the                
               sale of said property in any way, capacity or manner                   
               whatsoever, nor shall said parties of the first part                   
               have the right to, nor seek, a deficiency or other                     
               money judgment against said parties of the second part.                
          The court, however, noted such factors as the buyers’ absolute              
          right to title on full payment; the sellers’ lack of any right to           
          cancel except upon the purchasers’ default; and the buyers’                 
          possession of, and responsibility for taxes and insurance on, the           
          property.  See id. at 498.  Given these elements, the court                 
          declared:  “we do not feel that the single fact of a ‘no                    
          recourse’ clause served to delay the finality of this sale until            
          final payment of the total purchase price had been made.”  Id.              
          An identical result was reached on similar facts in Clodfelter v.           
          Commissioner, 426 F.2d 1391, 1395 (9th Cir. 1970).                          
               While we acknowledge that our opinion in Baertschi reached a           
          contrary conclusion on this issue, we have now reconsidered our             
          holding in light of reversal by the Court of Appeals for the                
          Sixth Circuit.  We are persuaded that the position of the Court             
          of Appeals on the effect of a non-recourse provision rests on               
          sound legal principles.  Accordingly, Baertschi v. Commissioner,            
          49 T.C. 289 (1967), will no longer be followed.  We further note            
          that this approach better harmonizes with our earlier ruling that           
          contracts with provisions closely analogous to those here and               
          which by their terms became “utterly null and void” on the                  
          buyer’s default, with the seller retaining all moneys paid,                 





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