Michele D. Livingston - Page 14




                                        - 14 -                                          
          amount of time to verify whether the facts established by                     
          petitioner met the conditions for relief under section 6015(c),               
          particularly considering that the new statute raised novel and                
          complex interpretive issues.  See Sokol v. Commissioner, 92 T.C.              
          760, 765 n.10 (1989).  We believe that respondent’s concession                
          within 5 months of petitioner’s election under section 6015 was               
          reasonable.  See Ashburn v. United States, 740 F.2d 843 (11th                 
          Cir. 1984) (United States was substantially justified in waiting              
          11 months after filing of complaint in Equal Access to Justice                
          case, because the issues were not simple); Rouffy v.                          
          Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-5 (5-month delay in conceding case              
          was not unreasonable where amended statute raised novel issues).              
               c.  Period After Respondent Conceded Relief Under Section                
               6015(c)                                                                  
               In Livingston v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-121, we                   
          concluded that respondent prevailed on the issue of whether he                
          was required to address petitioner’s election under section                   
          6015(b) after respondent had conceded that petitioner was                     
          entitled to relief under section 6015(c).  Respondent’s position              
          was substantially justified in this regard.  Moreover, for the                
          period after respondent had offered to concede that petitioner                
          was entitled to full relief from joint liability, petitioner                  
          unreasonably protracted the proceedings and is therefore                      
          ineligible for costs pursuant to section 7430(b)(3).  See Mearkle             
          v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 1256 (1988).                                         





Page:  Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  Next

Last modified: May 25, 2011