Henry and Esther Misle - Page 41




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            reasonable cause and in good faith is made case by case, taking                            
            into account all pertinent facts and circumstances.  See Compaq                            
            Computer Corp. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 214, 226 (1999);                          
            sec. 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.  In this case, there is                              
            ample evidence that Henry and Esther knew or had reason to know                            
            that the payments made by HJA on the FirsTier note and the                                 
            Chevrolet debt generated taxable income to them as determined in                           
            this opinion, including (1) the Baird, Kurtz letter explaining                             
            the consequences of the EOA, (2) Forms 1099 and letters of                                 
            explanation issued by HJA showing the amount of covenant not to                            
            compete payments made to Henry each year, (3) the fact that Henry                          
            and Esther reported as income some of the covenant not to compete                          
            payments made in 1990, (4) the establishment and operation of the                          
            sweep account, which coordinated the covenant payments with                                
            payments on the FirsTier note and the Chevrolet debt, and (5)                              
            Henry’s conflicting positions with regard to his liability for                             
            the FirsTier note and the Chevrolet debt taken in the State                                




                  22(...continued)                                                                     
            disclosure claim, argued in his opening brief that Henry and                               
            Esther’s disclosures on their 1992 and 1996 returns were not                               
            adequate, Henry and Esther still did not argue that they made an                           
            adequate disclosure for those years.  Since Henry and Esther did                           
            not raise adequate disclosure as a defense to the substantial                              
            understatement prong of the accuracy-related penalty at any point                          
            during the trial or briefing of this case, the issue of whether                            
            the 1992 and 1996 disclosures were adequate is not before us.                              






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