- 28 -
Moreover, on the record before us, we cannot conclude that HJA
litigated or had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
issue of whether Henry and Esther were accommodation parties
rather than primary obligors on the FirsTier note.
We hold that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not
preclude HJA from litigating the issue of whether Henry was an
accommodation party on the FirsTier note.
C. Accommodation Party Status Under Nebraska Law
Before 1992, Nebraska law defined “accommodation party” as
“one who signs the instrument in any capacity for the purpose of
lending his name to another party to it.” Neb. Rev. Stat. U.C.C.
sec. 3-415(1) (Reissue 1980). In 1991, Neb. Rev. Stat. U.C.C.
sec. 3-415 was revised and renumbered as Neb. Rev. Stat. U.C.C.
sec. 3-419 (Reissue 1992). Neb. Rev. Stat. U.C.C. sec. 3-419(a)
defines instruments signed for accommodation as follows:
If an instrument is issued for value given for the
benefit of a party to the instrument (“accommodated
party”) and another party to the instrument
(“accommodation party”) signs the instrument for the
purpose of incurring liability on the instrument
without being a direct beneficiary of the value given
for the instrument, the instrument is signed by the
accommodation party “for accommodation”. [Emphasis
added.]
The term “instrument” means a “negotiable instrument.” See Neb.
Rev. Stat. U.C.C. sec. 3-104(b) (Reissue 1992).
The intent of the parties determines whether a party is an
accommodation party or the principal obligor of an instrument.
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