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the EOA and the covenant not to compete clause therein. Indeed,
in its modified judgment the State court did not even address
whether Henry was an accommodation party as to the FirsTier
note-–the only reference to Henry’s status as an accommodation
party was in the postjudgment journal entry. In this case, the
issue we must decide is whether Henry and Esther are the primary
obligors on the FirsTier note. The issues are not identical;
thus, the first requirement is not met.
The remaining two requirements for collateral estoppel to
apply also are not met in this case. In United States v.
International Bldg. Co., supra at 506, the Supreme Court held
that
A judgment entered with the consent of the parties may
involve a determination of questions of fact and law by
the court. But unless a showing is made that that was
the case, the judgment has no greater dignity, so far
as collateral estoppel is concerned, than any judgment
entered only as a compromise of the parties.
In this case, the State court did not enter a judgment regarding
whether Henry and Esther were primary obligors or accommodation
parties with respect to the FirsTier note. Rather, it simply
made a journal entry that referred to Henry as an “accommodating
Party” in connection with a settlement of “certain conflicts
which have arisen in regards to the amount payable pursuant to
* * * the Modified Judgment”. Henry and Esther made no showing
whatsoever as to the nature of the journal entry or that it
embodied determinations of fact and law by the State court.
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