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Supp. 958 (N.D. Ind. 1976), affd. per curiam sub nom. Barter v.
United States, 550 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1977).
Petitioner seeks to add a new gloss to these old challenges
by identifying singles who share assets and income (whom he
labels “economic partners”) as a distinct class of taxpayers
disadvantaged by marital classifications. For the reasons set
forth below, we hold the tax code’s distinctions between married
taxpayers and unmarried economic partners to be constitutionally
valid.
In evaluating whether a statutory classification violates
equal protection, we generally apply a rational basis standard.
See Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547
(1983). We apply a higher standard of review only if it is found
that the statute (1) impermissibly interferes with the exercise
of a fundamental right or (2) employs a suspect classification,
such as race. See, e.g., id.; Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322
(1980). Neither of these exceptions applies.
Petitioner does not directly identify any fundamental right
impeded by the use of marital classifications in the tax code.
Petitioner cites commentary addressing the right to marry.
However, a law is considered to burden the right to marry only
where the obstacle to marriage imposed by the law operates to
preclude marriage entirely for a certain class of persons. See
DeMars v. Commissioner, supra at 250. The classifications at
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