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without the income-splitting benefit available to married
taxpayers. We held therein that the classification between
married and single taxpayers is founded upon a rational basis and
was a permissible attempt to account for the greater financial
burdens of married taxpayers and to equalize geographically their
tax treatment.5 See id. at 558-559.
Our holding in Kellems is of no less application here.
Congress had a rational basis for adopting marital
classifications in the tax code. That conclusion is not altered
by petitioner’s claim that there are additional classifications
that could have been made. Undoubtedly, certain inequalities
persisted between married taxpayers and unmarried economic
partners following the enactment of the joint filing provisions.
However, legislatures have especially broad latitude in creating
classification and distinctions in tax statutes. See Regan v.
Taxation With Representation, supra at 547. Moreover, “reform
may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of
the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.”
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
5Prior to 1948 each individual was taxed on his or her own
income regardless of marital status. However, under the Supreme
Court’s decision in Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930), married
couples in community property States were permitted to split
their community income evenly for Federal tax purposes regardless
of the amounts each actually earned. See Kellems v.
Commissioner, 58 T.C. 556, 558-559 (1972), affd. per curiam 474
F.2d 1399 (2d Cir. 1973).
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