- 7 - issue in this case are a consequence, not a cause, of petitioner’s nonmarried status, and thus do not burden the right to marry. See Druker v. Commissioner, 697 F.2d at 50. The marital classifications at issue also do not affect petitioner as a member of a suspect class. Petitioner claims discrimination not as a homosexual but as a person who shares assets and income with someone who is not his legal spouse. Petitioner therefore places himself in a class that includes nonmarried couples of the opposite sex, family members, and friends. We are aware of no authority that would render such group a suspect class.4 Under the rational basis standard, a challenged classification is valid if rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). In Kellems v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 556 (1972), affd. 474 F.2d 1399 (2d Cir. 1973), we addressed the constitutionality of the application of single return rates 4Petitioner claims that the Federal tax laws specifically began to target homosexuals as a group after the enactment of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). That law defines “marriage” in any act of Congress (which would include the Federal tax code) as a legal union “between one man and one woman” as husband and wife. The DOMA also defines the word “spouse” to mean only a person of the “opposite sex” who is a husband or wife. We decline to pass on the constitutionality of the DOMA because it was not effective for the years at issue in this case.Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Next
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