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issue in this case are a consequence, not a cause, of
petitioner’s nonmarried status, and thus do not burden the right
to marry. See Druker v. Commissioner, 697 F.2d at 50.
The marital classifications at issue also do not affect
petitioner as a member of a suspect class. Petitioner claims
discrimination not as a homosexual but as a person who shares
assets and income with someone who is not his legal spouse.
Petitioner therefore places himself in a class that includes
nonmarried couples of the opposite sex, family members, and
friends. We are aware of no authority that would render such
group a suspect class.4
Under the rational basis standard, a challenged
classification is valid if rationally related to a legitimate
governmental interest. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); City of New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). In Kellems v. Commissioner, 58
T.C. 556 (1972), affd. 474 F.2d 1399 (2d Cir. 1973), we addressed
the constitutionality of the application of single return rates
4Petitioner claims that the Federal tax laws specifically
began to target homosexuals as a group after the enactment of the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419
(1996). That law defines “marriage” in any act of Congress
(which would include the Federal tax code) as a legal union
“between one man and one woman” as husband and wife. The DOMA
also defines the word “spouse” to mean only a person of the
“opposite sex” who is a husband or wife. We decline to pass on
the constitutionality of the DOMA because it was not effective
for the years at issue in this case.
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