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federally authorized payments is to supplement traditional
eminent domain compensation, not to create an additional element
of full compensation.” Spackman v. Spackman, 595 P.2d 748, 750
(Kan. Ct. App. 1979).
The U.S. Claims Court likewise emphasized the distinctness
and self-contained nature of the Relocation Act when faced with
construing the meaning of “payment” for tax-exemption purposes.
See Strogoff v. United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 584 (1986), affd.
without published opinion 818 F.2d 877 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Although taxpayers argued that, in the exemption section,
“Congress used the term in a sense which is broader than the
cumulative uses found in the other sections”, the court declared
that “the least strained reading of the provision is that,
following a string of references to payments by government
entities, * * * use of the term ‘payments’ [sic] was intended
merely as a shorthand incorporation of the previous references in
the statute.” Id. at 589.
As regards application and how these legally distinct rights
to payment should interact in a factual scenario involving
condemnation, the Missouri Court of Appeals summarized:
In April, 1973, the Commission commenced an action
to condemn and acquire appellants’ residence and 7.99
acres of ground. That suit, no longer the subject of
any dispute, was concluded by entry of a consent
judgment in the amount of $38,100.00. Also available
to appellants, and conceded by the Commission to be
due, is a relocation assistance payment pursuant to the
Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property
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