- 15 - federally authorized payments is to supplement traditional eminent domain compensation, not to create an additional element of full compensation.” Spackman v. Spackman, 595 P.2d 748, 750 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979). The U.S. Claims Court likewise emphasized the distinctness and self-contained nature of the Relocation Act when faced with construing the meaning of “payment” for tax-exemption purposes. See Strogoff v. United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 584 (1986), affd. without published opinion 818 F.2d 877 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Although taxpayers argued that, in the exemption section, “Congress used the term in a sense which is broader than the cumulative uses found in the other sections”, the court declared that “the least strained reading of the provision is that, following a string of references to payments by government entities, * * * use of the term ‘payments’ [sic] was intended merely as a shorthand incorporation of the previous references in the statute.” Id. at 589. As regards application and how these legally distinct rights to payment should interact in a factual scenario involving condemnation, the Missouri Court of Appeals summarized: In April, 1973, the Commission commenced an action to condemn and acquire appellants’ residence and 7.99 acres of ground. That suit, no longer the subject of any dispute, was concluded by entry of a consent judgment in the amount of $38,100.00. Also available to appellants, and conceded by the Commission to be due, is a relocation assistance payment pursuant to the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real PropertyPage: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011