Carol M. Read, et al. - Page 26




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          determined that Ms. Blatt realized and must recognize long-term             
          capital gain as a result of that redemption.  See id.  Ms. Blatt            
          took the position in Blatt v. Commissioner, supra, that the                 
          redemption of her stock by Phyllograph qualified as a transfer of           
          property to a third party on behalf of Mr. Blatt under Q&A-9 that           
          is not taxable to her under section 1041(a).  See id. at 80.  In            
          support of her position, Ms. Blatt relied principally on Arnes v.           
          United States, supra.14  We rejected Ms. Blatt's position and               

               14The issue in Arnes v. United States, supra, was whether              
          the redemption of Ms. Arnes’ Moriah stock pursuant to the divorce           
          decree involved there constituted a transfer of property by Ms.             
          Arnes, the taxpayer before the Court of Appeals for the Ninth               
          Circuit in that case, to a third party on behalf of Mr. Arnes               
          within the meaning of Q&A-9.  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth            
          Circuit, the court to which an appeal in Ms. Read's case would              
          normally lie, noted, inter alia, that "Generally, a transfer is             
          considered to have been made 'on behalf of' someone if it satis-            
          fied an obligation or a liability of that person."  Id. at 459.             
          On the facts presented, that court held that the transfer by Ms.            
          Arnes of her Moriah stock to Moriah "did relieve John [Mr. Arnes]           
          of an obligation", id., and that that transfer constituted a                
          transfer to a third party on behalf of Mr. Arnes under Q&A-9, see           
          id.                                                                         
               In Ingham v. United States, 167 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 1999),             
          the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit revisited the meaning            
          of the phrase "transfer of property to a third party on behalf of           
          a spouse" in Q&A-9.  In Ingham, the Court of Appeals rejected the           
          taxpayer's expansive definition of that phrase, which included              
          "all transfers of property that result in a substantial benefit,            
          in any form, to the nontransferring or former spouse", because it           
          found such a definition to be inconsistent with Arnes v. United             
          States, supra.  According to the Court of Appeals in Ingham v.              
          United States, supra at 1244:                                               
               The focus of the court's analysis in Arnes [v. United                  
               States, supra] was not whether the plaintiff's [trans-                 
               ferring spouse's] former husband had received some                     
               general benefit as a result of the plaintiff's transac-                
                                                             (continued...)           





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