Carol M. Read, et al. - Page 28




                                       - 28 -                                         
          that person”.  Id.  We found that “petitioner [Ms. Blatt] does              
          not claim, and the record does not indicate, that the redemption            
          satisfied any obligation of [Mr.] Blatt.”  Id. at 81-82.  We                
          further concluded that Ms. Blatt did not otherwise show that she            
          was acting on behalf of Mr. Blatt.  See id. n.12.  We found that            
          Ms. Blatt failed to show error in respondent's determination to             
          treat the redemption involved there as a taxable event to her.              
          We held:                                                                    
               the record in the instant case is devoid of evidence                   
               disproving respondent's determination that petitioner's                
               [Ms. Blatt's] transfer of her stock to corporation                     
               [Phyllograph] was not on behalf of [Mr.] Blatt within                  
               the meaning of Q&A 9.  The redemption, in form, was a                  
               transaction between petitioner and corporation; she                    
               transferred her stock to corporation in exchange for                   
               its appreciated value in cash. * * *  [Id. at 81.]                     
               We did not decide in Blatt v. Commissioner, supra, that only           
          if the primary-and-unconditional-obligation standard is satisfied           
          as to the nontransferring spouse may a transfer by the transfer-            
          ring spouse to a corporation of such transferring spouse’s stock            
          in that corporation be considered to be a transfer of property by           
          a spouse to a third party on behalf of the nontransferring spouse           
          within the meaning of Q&A-9.16  Moreover, the illustration that             

               16Nor did we indicate in Blatt v. Commissioner, supra, that            
          the common, ordinary meaning (i.e., the dictionary definition) of           
          the phrase “on behalf of” which we cited with approval and on               
          which we relied in that case is to be applied for purposes of               
          Q&A-9 only to factual contexts that were not even involved in               
          Blatt, i.e., to factual contexts other than corporate redemp-               
          tions.  In addition, we did not indicate in Blatt that the                  
                                                             (continued...)           





Page:  Previous  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  Next

Last modified: May 25, 2011