- 36 -
consideration stated in that judgment was owed to Ms. Read. Ms.
Read’s transfer of her MMP stock to MMP (i.e., the transferring
spouse’s transfer of property to a third party) did not satisfy
that obligation of Mr. Read to Ms. Read.
We shall now determine whether under the common, ordinary
meaning of the phrase “on behalf of” which we cited with approval
and on which we relied in Blatt v. Commissioner, supra at 81, Ms.
Read’s transfer of her MMP stock to MMP was a transfer of prop-
erty by the transferring spouse to a third party on behalf of the
nontransferring spouse within the meaning of Q&A-9. We indicated
in Blatt that the common, ordinary meaning of the phrase “on
behalf of” in Q&A-9 is “in the interest of” or “as a representa-
tive of”. See id. at 81 (quoting Webster's Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary (1990)). Applying that meaning to the facts in the
instant cases,25 we find that Ms. Read was acting as Mr. Read’s
24(...continued)
Ms. Read’s [MMP] stock unless he affirmatively elected to pur-
chase the stock”. We find that contention of Mr. Read and MMP to
be contrary to the plain language of the divorce judgment and a
strained and unreasonable construction thereof. The divorce
judgment obligated Ms. Read to transfer to Mr. Read, and Mr. Read
to purchase from Ms. Read, her MMP stock. No condition had to be
satisfied under that judgment in order for those obligations to
exist. The divorce judgment did permit Mr. Read to elect to have
Ms. Read transfer her MMP stock to MMP or to MMP’s ESOP, instead
of to him, and to have MMP or MMP’s ESOP, instead of him, pur-
chase that stock from her. Mr. Read decided to, and did, make
that election.
25During the trial in the marriage dissolution action that
Ms. Read instituted against Mr. Read, Ms. Read and Mr. Read
(continued...)
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