- 7 -
earlier version of section 219,6 we apply its reasoning to the
facts of the present case.
Petitioners also contend that the record does not
demonstrate that MetLife made any contribution to the MetLife
plan on behalf of Mrs. Brandkamp, thereby implying that such a
failure would be antithetical to the conclusion that Mrs.
Brandkamp was an active participant in the plan. However, the
record demonstrates that the MetLife plan is a qualified plan, a
fact that supports our conclusion that a contribution was made
and thereby negates the basis for petitioners’ contention. See
sec. 401(a)(1).7
6 Sec. 219, as applicable to 1981, the taxable year in
issue in Eanes v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 168 (1985), did not
include a definition of “active participant”. The flush language
currently contained in sec. 219(g)(5), referring to whether the
individual’s rights under the plan are forfeitable, was then
found only in the legislative history.
7 To the extent that petitioners may suggest that the
contribution made by MetLife on behalf of Mrs. Brandkamp was
modest in amount, thereby implying that the magnitude of an
employer’s contribution should be determinative of whether an
employee is an active participant, the law is clearly to the
contrary. See sec. 1.219-2(d)(1), Income Tax Regs., providing
that an individual is an active participant in a taxable year in
a profit-sharing plan “if an employer contribution is added to
the participant’s account in such taxable year.” See also sec.
1.219-2(b)(1), Income Tax Regs., providing that “an individual is
an active participant * * * if for any portion of the plan year
* * * [she] is not excluded under the eligibility provisions of
the plan.” In short, there is no provision for “de minimis”
participation. See also Guest v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 768
(1979) (the statutory provision, which operates to disallow a
deduction for a contribution to an IRA by an active participant
(continued...)
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011