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further trial and relies on brief on the bank deposits method of
reconstructing income. We conclude that respondent is not
relying on a new basis or a new theory in support of respondent’s
determinations in the notices that remain at issue with respect
to petitioner’s Schedule C gross receipts for 1991, 1992, and
1993. We further conclude that the evidence required to prove
that for each of those years the total amount of deposits into
petitioner’s accounts from each source that remains at issue is
or is not taxable to petitioner is the same evidence required to
prove that the total amount of each deposit into petitioner’s
accounts that remains at issue is or is not taxable to him.
On the record before us, we reject petitioner’s position
that respondent has the burden of proving that each of the
deposits that remains at issue for each of the years 1991, 1992,
and 1993 is taxable. On that record, we find that petitioner has
the burden of proving that each of those deposits was derived
from a nontaxable source or constitutes income which he previ-
ously reported. See Rule 142(a); Calhoun v. United States,
supra; Clayton v. Commissioner, supra at 645.
It is also petitioner’s position that respondent has the
burden of proof with respect to the affirmative allegations in
respondent’s amendment to answer that, in addition to the amount
of the cost of goods sold claimed in the Schedule C for 1993 and
disallowed in the notice for that year, petitioner is not enti-
tled for that year to $42,913 of the remaining amount of the cost
of goods sold claimed in that Schedule C. We need not decide
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