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position as to the meaning of the word “assets” as used in
section 108(d)(3), petitioners have failed to show that petition-
ers’ fishing permit is in all instances exempt from the claims of
creditors under the law of the State of Alaska.
Our function in interpreting the Code is to construe it in a
way that will give effect to the intent of Congress. See Merkel
v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. 463, 468 (1997), affd. 192 F.3d 844
(9th Cir. 1999). Our starting point in resolving the parties’
dispute over the meaning of the word “assets” as used in section
108(d)(3) is the plain meaning of the language used by Congress.
See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982);
Merkel v. Commissioner, 192 F.3d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 1999), affg.
109 T.C. 463 (1997). Where, as is the case here, the statute
does not define the word,6 we generally interpret it by using its
ordinary and common meaning. See Merkel v. Commissioner, 192
F.3d at 848 (quoting United States v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015,
1022 (9th Cir. 1998)). If the ordinary and common meaning of the
statutory language in question supports only one construction,
6When Congress defined the term “insolvent” in sec.
108(d)(3) to mean the excess of liabilities over the fair market
value of assets, it did not provide in sec. 108 a definition of
the word “assets” (or the word “liabilities”, see Merkel v.
Commissioner, 109 T.C. 463, 468 (1997), affd. 192 F.3d 844 (9th
Cir. 1999)). Nor does the Code contain any generally applicable
definition of the word “assets” (or the word “liabilities”, see
id.). The regulations promulgated under sec. 108 do not elabo-
rate on the definition of the term “insolvency” in sec. 108(d)(3)
and do not define the word “assets” (or the word “liabilities”,
see id.) used in that definition.
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