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that statutory language is unambiguous. See id. (quoting Cali-
fornia v. Montrose Chem. Corp., 104 F.3d 1507, 1514 (9th Cir.
1997)). However, where the ordinary and common meaning of the
statutory language supports more than one interpretation, the
statutory language is ambiguous, and we may consult legislative
history to assist us in interpreting the language in question.
See Merkel v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. at 468-469. We are to
construe exclusions from income, like section 108(a)(1)(B),
narrowly in favor of taxation. See Merkel v. Commissioner, 192
F.3d at 848 (citing United States v. Centennial Sav. Bank FSB,
499 U.S. 573, 583 (1991); Harbor Bancorp & Subsidiaries v.
Commissioner, 115 F.3d 722, 732 (9th Cir. 1997)).
Bearing in mind the foregoing principles of statutory
construction, we shall consider initially respondent’s contention
that the plain meaning of the word “assets” supports only one
construction of that word as used in section 108(d)(3). As
pertinent here, the common and ordinary meaning of the word
“assets” set forth in Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 69
(10th ed. 1996) is:
1 pl a : the property of a deceased person subject by
law to the payment of his or her debts and legacies b :
the entire property of a person, association, corpora-
tion, or estate applicable or subject to the payment of
debts * * * 3 * * * b pl : the items on a balance sheet
showing the book value of property owned
The first and second dictionary definitions of the word “assets”
quoted above appear to exclude from that definition assets exempt
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