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“demonstrates” that the electing spouse, as of the time the joint
income tax return was signed, had actual knowledge of the item
that gave rise to the deficiency. The statutory language does
not expressly use the words “burden of proof”, and the statutory
language does not quantify the evidentiary standard respondent
must satisfy in order to demonstrate the electing spouse’s actual
knowledge.
In Cheshire v. Commissioner, supra at 193, and in a number
of other recent opinions, we have repeated the statutory language
(“If the Secretary demonstrates * * * actual knowledge”) without
expressly using the words “burden of proof” and without
discussing the quantity or level of proof that is required for
respondent to demonstrate the electing spouse’s actual knowledge.
See also Charlton v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 333, 341 (2000);
Amankwah v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-382.
In a number of other recent opinions, we have stated
expressly that the above statutory language of section
6015(c)(3)(C) shifts the burden of proof from the electing spouse
to respondent with regard to the actual knowledge element, but
without quantifying the level of that burden of proof. See
Martin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-346 (“respondent bears
the burden of showing that * * * [the taxpayer] had ‘actual
knowledge’”); Mitchell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-332 (“We
note that in general under sec. 6015(c) the taxpayer has the
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