- 15 -
embezzlement activity). We again emphasize, however, that the
standard under section 6015(c) is not that of a hypothetical,
reasonable person, but only that of Michael’s actual subjective
knowledge. See Wiksell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-32
(“Petitioner further argues that section 6015(c) has changed the
culpability standard from objective under section 6013(e) to
subjective. * * * Our finding was based on * * * [taxpayer's]
subjective awareness of the * * * [item]”), affd. without
published opinion 215 F.3d 1335 (9th Cir. 2000);4 H. Conf. Rept.
105-599, supra at 253, 1998-3 C.B. at 1007 (“Such actual
knowledge must be established by the evidence and shall not be
inferred based on indications that the electing spouse had a
reason to know.”).
Because of our conclusion that Michael qualifies for relief
under section 6015(c), we need not rule on Michael’s claim of
relief under section 6015(b).
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered under
Rule 155.
4 For the prior history of Wiksell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1999-32, see Wiksell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-3, on
remand from Wiksell v. Commissioner, 90 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir.
1996), revg. and remanding T.C. Memo. 1994-99.
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