Michael G. Culver and Christine M. Culver - Page 14




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          credible and persuasive.  Combined with Michael’s testimony and             
          the other evidence in this case, we conclude that respondent has            
          not satisfied his burden of proving by a preponderance of the               
          credible evidence that Michael had actual knowledge of                      
          Christine’s embezzlement income, and we conclude that Michael               
          qualifies for relief under section 6015(c).                                 
               Respondent argues that the family expenditures, home                   
          improvements, Michael’s fishing and hunting trips, and the                  
          deposits into the joint checking account should have, and would             
          have, given Michael actual knowledge of the embezzled income.  We           
          find respondent’s arguments as to what Michael should have known            
          to be misplaced.  As stated and as we have held, the standard               
          under section 6015(c) is actual knowledge, and respondent has the           
          burden to prove Michael’s actual knowledge by a preponderance of            
          the evidence.  Further, respondent’s burden of proof under                  
          section 6015(c)(3)(C) is not met by mere proof of what a                    
          reasonably prudent person would be expected to know.3                       
               Arguably, the deposits into petitioners’ joint bank account,           
          in particular, would indicate that Michael should have been aware           
          of some source of the deposits greater than his and Christine’s             
          wages and that Michael should have inquired as to what that                 
          source was (particularly in light of Christine’s prior                      


          3  We do not intend to suggest that in an appropriate case                  
          respondent’s burden to prove actual knowledge may not be                    
          established by circumstantial evidence.                                     





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