Epic Associates 84-III, William C. Griffith, Jr. - Page 171




                                       - 98 -                                         
                  1982), revg. and remanding on other grounds                         
                  Brountas v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 491 (1979);                       
                  Brountas v. Commissioner, 692 F.2d 152, 157 (1st                    
                  Cir. 1982), vacating and remanding on other                         
                  grounds 73 T.C. 491 (1979); Gibson Products Co.                     
                  v. United States, 637 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1981);                    
                  Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. Co. v. United                      
                  States, 205 Ct. Cl. 597, 505 F.2d 1266 (1974);                      
                  Lemery v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 367, 377-378                        
                  (1969), affd. on another issue 451 F.2d 173 (9th                    
                  Cir. 1971); Inter-City Television Film Corp. v.                     
                  Commissioner, 43 T.C. 270, 287 (1964); Albany Car                   
                  Wheel Co. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 831 (1963),                      
                  affd. per curiam 333 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1964).                       
                  For example, in Lemery v. Commissioner, supra, we                   
                  held that an obligation to pay $444,335.17 of the                   
                  $1,131,000 stated purchase price of a business                      
                  only out of future "net profits" was too                            
                  contingent to be included in  the purchaser’s                       
                  amortizable basis.  [Fn. refs. omitted.]                            

                  Respondent takes the position in the instant cases                  
             that none of the first mortgage notes issued by EA 83-XII                
             or EA 84-III is a bona fide debt because the aggregate                   
             principal amount of the notes issued by each partnership                 
             exceeds the aggregate fair market value of the property                  
             securing the notes and, for that reason, neither                         
             partnership had an incentive to repay the notes.  See,                   
             e.g., Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045                  
             (9th Cir. 1976), affg. 64 T.C. 752 (1975).  Respondent does              
             not rely on a disparity between the purchase price of the                
             properties and their value, and neither respondent nor                   
             petitioners address the question whether the value                       
             comparison required under the Estate of Franklin line                    






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