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render superfluous the second Schleier requirement for such
torts, thereby contradicting the Supreme Court’s characterization
of these two requirements as “independent”. Id.
Petitioners’ argument is plainly incorrect, however,
proceeding as it does from a faulty premise that a tort-based
cause of action for fraudulent inducement protects only
inherently personal rights, such as dignitary rights. It is
hornbook law that torts generally encompass not just invasions of
personal dignitary rights but any “civil wrong, other than breach
of contract, for which the court will provide a remedy in the
form of an action for damages.” Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton
on the Law of Torts, sec. 1, at 2 (5th ed. 1984). More
particularly, although the tort of fraud might involve personal
injury, it generally involves “‘injury to property rather than to
person’”. Food Fair, Inc. v. Anderson, 382 So. 2d 150, 154 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (quoting 37 Am. Jur. 2d, Fraud and Deceit,
sec. 292 (1968)). In a fraudulent inducement claim, “‘Generally,
the plaintiff’s loss is a purely economic loss’”. HTP, Ltd. v.
Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 685 So. 2d 1238, 1240 (Fla.
1996) (quoting with approval from the dissent in Woodson v.
Martin, 663 So. 2d 1327, 1330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995), revd.
685 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 1996)).
Consequently, contrary to petitioners’ argument and
consistent with the two-prong test enunciated in Schleier, the
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