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that USI’s actions regarding the dividends and the
Leesburg Bank caused Gregg damage. In addition, the
jury could have determined that had USI released the
dividends, the Leesburg Bank would not have liquidated
Gregg’s stock, a drastic measure taken by banks when
loans become undercollateralized or no longer secured
to the bank’s satisfaction, prevention or delay of
which would have been a benefit to Gregg; a benefit
which he was denied, thus causing him damage.
We hold that the evidence in the record supports
the jury’s determination that Gregg established his
claim for tortious interference with his business
relationship. The jury’s award of $43,050 in
compensatory damages was also supported by the range of
the evidence. * * * [Gregg v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 887
F.2d at 1475; citations omitted.]
In sum, the evidence clearly indicates a direct correlation
between petitioner’s damages award for tortious interference and
his economic injuries. Petitioners have failed to show that the
amount of damages was affected by any personal injuries--indeed,
the Court of Appeals’ discussion supra strongly suggests that it
was not. Accordingly, we adhere to our original conclusion that
petitioners have failed to show that the damages awarded for
tortious interference were received on account of personal
injuries or sickness within the meaning of section 104(a)(2).
Prejudgment Interest
In our original opinion, we followed well-established
precedents in holding that petitioner’s award of prejudgment
interest was not excludable from gross income under section
104(a)(2). See Bagley v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 396, 419 (1995),
affd. 121 F.3d 393 (8th Cir. 1997); Kovacs v. Commissioner, 100
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