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approximation, the valuation figure we determine need not be one
as to which there is specific testimony as long as it is within
the range of values that may properly be arrived at from
consideration of all the evidence. See Silverman v.
Commissioner, 538 F.2d 927, 933 (2d Cir. 1976), affg. T.C. Memo.
1974-285; Estate of Simplot v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 130, 155
(1999).
Respondent applied the hypothetical willing buyer and
willing seller standard set forth under section 20.2031-1(b),
Estate Tax Regs., and relied on Rev. Rul. 59-60, supra, to
determine the total value of the stocks of JM and Specialty and
the interests that were transferred and received by Cyril under
the 1951 Agreement. The estate applied a hypothetical willing
buyer and willing seller standard and relied on valuation
guidelines it felt were reasonably consistent with Rev. Rul. 59-
60, supra, to determine the overall value of JM and Specialty.
However, the estate argues that the reality of the actual
exchange between Cyril and Joseph must be considered for purposes
of applying discounts and control premiums to the actual property
interests transferred and received by Cyril.11
11The estate argues that the consideration received by Cyril
must be measured from his standpoint, not that of a hypothetical
buyer, but at the same time it relies on Mr. Browning’s appraisal
which he indicated at trial was based on a hypothetical willing
buyer and willing seller. The estate seems at times to argue
that its valuation figures would be the same under either
(continued...)
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