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necessarily had to have land attached. Petitioners argue that
under applicable Georgia law, both the relinquished property and
the replacement property are characterized as real property
interests, and that under Commissioner v. Crichton, 122 F.2d 181
(5th Cir. 1941), affg. 42 B.T.A. 490 (1940), the subject
transaction qualifies as a tax-deferred like-kind exchange within
the meaning of section 1031.
Respondent argues that under Georgia law, the 2-year timber
cutting contract was personal property and thus not of like kind
to the replacement real property. In addition, relying on Oregon
Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 192 (1953), respondent argues
that regardless of how the property interests may be
characterized under State law, the property relinquished and the
properties received differ so intrinsically that they are not of
like kind within the meaning of section 1031.3
2. Petitioners’ Alternative Argument: Lack of Actual or
Constructive Receipt in 1994
On brief, petitioners raise an alternative argument that
regardless of whether the subject transaction qualifies as a
3 Respondent does not dispute that petitioners have met all
other requirements for a nontaxable exchange of property held for
productive use in a trade or business or for investment within
the meaning of sec. 1031. In particular, respondent does not
dispute that petitioner’s transaction with Rayonier constituted
an “exchange” within the meaning of sec. 1031 or that petitioners
have satisfied the requirements of sec. 1031(a)(3), which in the
case of a nonsimultaneous exchange generally requires that the
replacement property be identified no more than 45 days after,
and the exchange be completed no more than 180 days after, the
transfer of the relinquished property.
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