D. G. Smalley and Nell R. Smalley - Page 11




                                       - 11 -                                         
          B.  Lack of Prejudice to Respondent in Addressing Actual or                 
               Constructive Receipt                                                   
               A party may rely on a theory only if it provides the                   
          opposing party fair warning so that the opposing party is not               
          prejudiced in its ability to prepare its case.  See Pagel, Inc.             
          v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 200, 211 (1988), affd. 905 F.2d 1190               
          (8th Cir. 1990).  Accordingly, a party may not raise an issue for           
          the first time on brief where surprise and prejudice are found to           
          exist.  See Seligman v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 191, 198-199                  
          (1985), affd. 796 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1986).  The general rule               
          against raising new issues on brief is not absolute, being                  
          “founded upon the exercise of judicial discretion in determining            
          whether considerations of surprise and prejudice require that a             
          party be protected from having to face a belated confrontation              
          which precludes or limits that party’s opportunity to present               
          pertinent evidence.”  Ware v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1267, 1268              
          (1989), affd. 906 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1990).                                   
               Respondent does not contend that he has been prejudiced in             
          developing or presenting evidence regarding petitioners’                    
          alternative argument.  In respondent’s reply brief, respondent’s            
          response to motion by petitioners to supplement brief, and                  
          respondent’s supplemental reply brief, the only prejudice that              
          respondent suggests would arise from our consideration of                   
          petitioners’ alternative argument relates to respondent’s failure           
          to determine a deficiency for petitioners’ 1995 taxable year.  If           





Page:  Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  Next

Last modified: May 25, 2011