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to determine his tax liabilities. From petitioner’s failure to
call Margulies to testify about this critical issue, we infer
that if Margulies had testified, then her testimony would have
been harmful to petitioner. See O’Dwyer v. Commissioner, 266
F.2d 575, 584 (4th Cir. 1959), affg. 28 T.C. 698, 703 (1957);
Stoumen v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 903, 907 (3d Cir. 1953), affg.
a Memorandum Opinion of this Court dated March 13, 1953; Wichita
Terminal Elevator Co. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 1158, 1165 (1946),
affd. 162 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1947).
On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that there are no
special circumstances present in the instant case which warrant
an exception to the normal rules of res judicata preclusion.
We hold for respondent on this issue.8
II. Petitioner’s Tax Filing Status
Respondent contends that petitioner filed a separate 1994
tax return, not a joint tax return, and relies on the following:
(1) Mary did not sign the tax return that petitioner filed, and
(2) Mary filed a separate tax return for 1994. Respondent argues
that Mary neither authorized petitioner to sign the 1994 tax
return on her behalf, nor consented to the filing of a joint tax
return for 1994. Petitioner contends that he is entitled to the
8Accordingly, we do not consider (1) respondent’s
alternative contentions as to collateral estoppel, and (2) the
parties’ contentions as to the proper tax treatment of each
category of petitioner’s income or receipts from NHP.
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