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If we were to construe literally the statement of the Court
of Appeals that fraud on the court is the only exception to the
general rule of finality in the Seventh Circuit, then we could
dispose of petitioner’s motion for leave in short order. After
all, petitioner has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any
fraud on the court. However, the statement of the Court of
Appeals was made in the context of the Tax Court’s lack of
general equitable powers, and one might question whether vacating
an otherwise final decision for lack of jurisdiction is
equivalent to vacating such a decision on grounds such as
“mistake, newly discovered evidence, and the like.” Kenner v.
Commissioner, supra.
In the present case, the parties have proceeded as if lack
of jurisdiction is an exception to the general rule of finality
in the Seventh Circuit. Because such an approach is not flatly
inconsistent with Drobny v. Commissioner, supra, we have chosen
to address petitioner’s contentions on their merits.
Petitioner contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction to
bind petitioner because the petition was filed without proper
authorization from petitioner. See Hoj v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.
1074 (1956). Whether the filing of the petition was authorized
or later ratified by petitioner is a question of fact to be
determined based on principles of the law of agency, as
applicable under Illinois law. See Mishawaka Properties Co., 100
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