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plan of the Judges’ Retirement Law, not simply [in relation] to
the portions of that law that provide for the amount of the
payments.” We agree with petitioners.
Respondent cites Kane v. United States, 43 F.3d at 1449, as
support for his position. However, we could not find any
language in Kane which can be read so broadly as to state or
imply that we must look only to the specific provisions of a
statute under which payments are calculated and paid. We find
respondent’s position to be short-sighted and an overly technical
reading of statements made in the relevant opinions.11 CGC
sections 75075 and 75076(a) do not themselves provide for
retirement, and only after going through the entire statutory
framework of the Judges’ Retirement Law, namely, CGC section
75025 or CGC sections 75060(a) and 75061(a), do we ultimately
reach the payment provisions. The provisions under which Judge
11Respondent cites the following language in Kane v. United
States, 43 F.3d 1446, 1450 (Fed. Cir. 1994): “The courts,
therefore, were required to make an inquiry as to the portion of
the statute under which payments were awarded.” Respondent has
taken this statement out of context. This statement was part of
a discussion involving Neill v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1015
(1951), and other cases, upon which petitioners rely. The
discussion suggests, contrary to respondent’s argument, that when
faced with a statute that has a dual purpose, courts must further
inquire as to whether the taxpayer was retired for a work-related
disability under that specific provision that is in the nature of
a workers’ compensation act or was retired on some other basis.
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