Raymond J. and Jacquelyn M. Byrne - Page 17




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          provision that does not qualify as a statute in the nature of a             
          workers’ compensation act.14                                                

               14The statute in this case is similar to the statute at                
          issue in Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1998-50-005 (Dec. 11, 1998).  The                  
          statute therein provided for “disability coverage to each member            
          who has at least five years of total service credit and                     
          disability coverage for on-duty illness or injury to each member            
          who is a law enforcement officer, regardless of length of                   
          service.”  Consistent with our opinion herein, the Internal                 
          Revenue Service ruled as follows:                                           
                    The Statute contains two provisions for the                       
               payment of disability benefits.  The first clause                      
               provides “disability coverage to each member who has at                
               least five years of total service credit.”  The second                 
               clause provides “disability coverage for on-duty                       
               illness or injury to each member who is a law                          
               enforcement officer, regardless of length of service.”                 
               The fact that one part of a statute is not a statute in                
               the nature of a workmen’s compensation act (i.e., the                  
               first clause) does not preclude another part of the                    
               same statute from meeting the requirements of section                  
               104(a)(1) of the Code.  This is true notwithstanding                   
               that the same disabilities may qualify for compensation                
               under either provision.  See, Take v. Commissioner, 82                 
               T.C. 630 (1984) aff’d 804 F2d 553 (9th Cir. 1986).  The                
               first clause of the Statute is not a statute in the                    
               nature of a workmen’s compensation act because it                      
               provides benefits regardless of the cause of the                       
               disability to employees with at least five years of                    
               total service credit.  The second clause of the Statute                
               provides compensation to law enforcement officers only                 
               for personal injuries or sickness incurred in the                      
               course of employment and regardless of length of                       
               service.  Accordingly, the second clause of the Statute                
               is a statute in the nature of a workmen’s compensation                 
               act.                                                                   
          Although private letter rulings are not precedent, sec.                     
          6110(k)(3), they do reveal the interpretation put upon the                  
          statute by the agency charged with the responsibility of                    
          administering the revenue laws.  Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452           
          U.S. 247, 261 n.17 (1981); Hanover Bank v. Commissioner, 369 U.S.           
          672, 686-687 (1962); Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner, 97               
          T.C. 74, 84 n.5 (1991); Woods Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 85 T.C.             
                                                             (continued...)           




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