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LARO, J., dissenting: In order to seize jurisdiction over
this case, the majority today takes the Court a step away from
long-established principles of statutory construction by refusing
to apply the plain meaning of the statute enacted by Congress.
The issues at hand could and should have been resolved merely by
applying the obvious plain meaning of the statute and following
recent precedent. Instead, the majority opts to rewrite the
statute to achieve a practical and result-oriented decision. In
so doing, the majority abandons and cuts the mooring of strict
construction, disregards precedent, and sends the Court drifting
without reliable navigation hoping to find refuge in a practical
result.
I have nothing against practical decisions. Courts should
strive to arrive at real world results. But it is Congress that
is empowered by our Constitution to legislate, and it is neither
the responsibility nor the province of this (or any other) Court
to create law deliberately and audaciously while disregarding a
specific statutory scheme that Congress has prescribed.
Practical results have virtue when they occur in the context of
conventional statutory construction. Result-oriented decisions
such as the one reached by the majority, on the other hand,
disregard plain Congressional intent and encroach on the
responsibility of the legislature. To state the obvious, there
is abundant authority to dictate that a plain meaning
interpretation of the statutory text is required absent
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