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Fed. R. Evid. 702; Snyder v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 529, 534
(1989). The Court, however, is not bound by an expert’s opinion.
We weigh an expert’s testimony in light of his or her
qualifications and with respect to all credible evidence in the
record. Depending on what we believe is appropriate under the
facts and circumstances of the case, we may either reject an
expert’s opinion in its entirety, accept it in its entirety, or
accept selected portions of it. Helvering v. Natl. Grocery Co.,
304 U.S. 282, 294-295 (1938); Seagate Tech., Inc., & Consol.
Subs. v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 149, 186 (1994); Parker v.
Commissioner, 86 T.C. 547, 562 (1986).
We reject most of Fishman’s testimony. For the three
reasons set forth below, we are unimpressed with his conclusion
and its underlying rationale. First, he reached his conclusion
relying primarily upon: (1) Specific data that he received
mainly from Haff12 and (2) general data that he derived from a
statistical compilation by Robert Morris Associates (Robert
Morris). Fishman independently verified none of this data,
relying blindly upon it. As to the specific data, Haff is
clearly an interested party given his relationship to petitioner
and his pecuniary interest in the outcome of this case. We find
disturbing that Fishman, while acknowledging to the Court that he
12 Fishman also spoke with Emile, Willett, Osgood,
Beauchesne, and petitioner’s accountants.
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