Raymond M. and Joy D. Jean - Page 10




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          her manager had the sole authority to decide whether she was to             
          receive training and whether petitioners’ case was to be                    
          reassigned to another revenue agent.  Those decisions constituted           
          managerial and not ministerial acts.  Example 4 of the temporary            
          regulations assists in the resolution of this issue:                        
               A revenue agent is sent to a training course, and                      
               the agent’s supervisor decides not to reassign the                     
               agent’s cases.  During the training course, no                         
               work is done on the cases assigned to the agent.                       
               Neither the decision to send the agent to the                          
               training course nor the decision not to reassign                       
               the agent’s cases is, under the circumstances, a                       
               ministerial act.  Thus, interest attributable to                       
               the delay cannot be abated.  [Sec. 301.6604-2T(b),                     
               Example (4), Temporary Proced. & Admin. Regs., 52                      
               Fed. Reg. 30163 (Aug. 13, 1987).]                                      
          See Jacobs v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-123; Gorgie v.                  
          Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-80.  Because there is no                      
          “ministerial” act performed by respondent’s employees or officers           
          that caused any delay in the resolution of petitioners’ case,               
          respondent could not abate interest for this period.                        
          Accordingly, we uphold respondent’s final determination not to              
          abate interest for this first period.                                       
               With respect to the second period at issue, which because of           
          the parties’ settlement now only involves October 7, 1997,                  
          through January 20, 1998, and August 7 through October 28, 1998,            
          petitioners’ argument centers on the allegedly unreasonable delay           
          resulting from the assignment of their case to a new revenue                
          agent who, during the processing of petitioners’ case, died.                






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