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before us that petitioner has failed to persuade us that she
would not be able to pay a reasonable amount for basic living
expenses if she remained jointly and severally liable for peti-
tioner’s unpaid liability for 1995.26 The record before us
establishes that petitioner, inter alia: (1) Has been employed
25(...continued)
documentary evidence, we have found that she established such
expenses.
26In attempting to persuade us that she would not be able to
pay a reasonable amount for basic living expenses if she were not
granted relief under sec. 6015(f), petitioner advances various
contentions, all of which we find to be without merit. To
illustrate, petitioner appears to contend that the $545 judgment
obtained for an unpaid medical bill, which judgment remained
unsatisfied as of the time of the trial herein, shows that she
has been unable to pay a reasonable amount for basic living
expenses. However, petitioner testified that the underlying
medical bill with respect to which the $545 judgment in question
was obtained “has been paid off.” Petitioner apparently disputes
the validity of the $545 judgment in question and therefore has
refused to pay it. On the record before us, we find that peti-
tioner’s testimony does not establish that petitioner has been
unable to pay the $545 judgment in question.
By way of further illustration, petitioner contends on brief
that petitioner’s “telephones had been disconnected for three
(3) months”, the implication being that petitioner was not able
to afford to pay her telephone bill. To support her contention
regarding her inability to pay her telephone bill for 3 months,
petitioner relies on the notation “Disconnected called 11/9/00"
that appeared in the margin of petitioner’s statement of dis-
agreement with respect to respondent’s October 29, 1999 letter
stating that she was not entitled to relief under sec. 6015(f).
We reject the inference that petitioner attempts to draw from
that notation. The record establishes that the number shown in
petitioner’s statement of disagreement was petitioner’s telephone
number at Questar, and not her home telephone number. Further-
more, petitioner’s contention that “telephones had been discon-
nected for three (3) months” is not supported by any evidence in
the record.
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