Edward A. Robinson III and Diana R. Robinson - Page 56




                                       - 30 -                                         
               Application of this general rule (if the statutory language            
          is different, then it is presumed that the meaning is different)            
          to the matter before us leads to the conclusion that section                
          163(h)(2)(A) means something different from the statutory                   
          provisions interpreted in the pre-TRA 1986 opinions.11                      


               10(...continued)                                                       
               you give the reader clear warning).                                    
               To the same effect, see Dickerson, The Interpretation and              
          Application of Statutes 224 (1975), quoted in Zuanich v.                    
          Commissioner, 77 T.C. 428, 443 n.26 (1981), as follows:                     
                    26 See R. Dickerson, The Interpretation and                       
               Application of Statutes 224 (1975), as follows:                        
               Because legal documents are for the most part                          
               nonemotive, it is presumed that the author’s language                  
               has been used, not for its artistic or emotional                       
               effect, but for its ability to convey ideas.                           
               Accordingly, it is presumed that the author has not                    
               varied his terminology unless he has changed his                       
               meaning, and has not changed his meaning unless he has                 
               varied his terminology; that is, that he has committed                 
               neither “elegant variation” nor “utraquistic                           
               subterfuge”.  This is the rebuttable presumption of                    
               formal consistency.  [Fn. refs. omitted.]                              
          See also Hirsch, Drafting Federal Law, sec. 5.2 (3d ed. 1992).              
               11  This presumption is rebuttable.  In the TAMRA 1988                 
          amendments, at every step in the enactment of the change from               
          “incurred or continued in connection with the conduct of” to                
          “properly allocable to” the Congress stated the intention that              
          this was done to effectuate more clearly the original intention             
          of TRA 1986 and not to change the meaning of the statute.  See              
          infra, Appendix.  Consistent with these statements of                       
          congressional intent, the TAMRA 1988 amendments took “effect as             
          if included in the provision of” the TRA 1986 to which the TAMRA            
          1988 amendments relate.  See also Redlark v. Commissioner, 106              
          T.C. at 34 n.3.  However, the parties have not directed our                 
          attention to, and we have not found, any evidence that either the           
                                                             (continued...)           





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