- 23 -
F.3d 727, 736-737 (7th Cir. 2001); see, e.g. Cherin v.
Commissioner, 89 T.C. 986 (1987). In other words, we are to
disregard the connotations of the term, or handle, that the
Congress adopts and instead focus on the language that the
Congress actually used to define the term. This is especially
true where, as in the instant case, the Congress tells us what
the term in question “means”. “As a rule, ‘a definition which
declares what a term ‘means’ . . . excludes any meaning that is
not stated.’” Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392-393 n.10
(1979). If, however, the statute in question uses the word
“includes” rather than “means” to define a term, then there is an
indication that the definition of the term is exemplary rather
than exclusive. Sec. 7701(c); see Winterrowd v. David Freedman
and Co., Inc., 724 F.2d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1984)(citing Highway &
City Freight Drivers v. Gordon Transports, Inc., 576 F.2d 1285,
1289 (8th Cir. 1978)).
In Cherin v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. at 1000-1001, we
addressed, inter alia, whether the taxpayer’s deficiencies were
subject to a higher rate of interest under what was then (as to
interest accruing after Dec. 31, 1984) section 6621(c)9, dealing
with interest on a substantial underpayment attributable to a
“tax-motivated transaction”. We found as facts in Cherin v.
9 Sec. 6621(c) later was repealed by sec. 7721(b) of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101-239, 103
Stat. 2106, 2399.
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