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more than merely collate materials from the official committee
reports or clarify inconsistencies therein, and instead purports
to add a new gloss to the statute, we should be free to disregard
the Blue Book explanation or at least accord it greatly reduced
interpretive weight.
Third, the stark divergence between this Court’s analysis in
Redlark, where we felt compelled to disregard the Blue Book
language altogether, and in the majority opinion, which appears
to treat it as a substantial component of its analysis, might be
thought to largely account for the different results then and
now. As demonstrated, however, by the decisions of the five
courts of appeal to address this issue, which have coalesced
around a straightforward analysis of judicial deference to agency
actions, the Blue Book language (with or without the Joint
Committee summary) is not dispositive of the validity of the
Treasury regulations (which is, after all, the issue before us).
Rather, the Treasury regulations are ultimately validated as
reasonably interpreting a facially ambiguous statute. The Blue
Book language in question, while supportive of this result, is
not essential to it. By unduly elevating the Blue Book’s role in
our analysis, we risk giving encouragement to inventive counsel
in future cases to troll deeply for other types of
noncontrolling legislative materials that might be argued to
betoken congressional intent.
GERBER and GALE, JJ., agree with this concurring opinion.
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