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branch.” United States v. Barlow, 41 F.3d 935, 943 (5th Cir.
1994). Thus, Congress is considered to have been aware of
Standing, Polk, and Reise when enacting section 163(h)(2)(A).
The majority contends that Standing, Polk, and Reise were
rendered ineffective by the passage of section 163(h)(2)(A)
because section 163(h)(2)(A) is different from the statutes on
which the holdings of those cases were based, and thus this
change in language indicates a change in the meaning of the
statute. Majority op. p. 29 (citing Russello v. United States,
464 U.S. 16 (1983)). However, it is well settled that when
Congress seeks to overturn prior case law, it must do so in an
explicit manner; an implicit inference to change the status quo
is impermissible. Bush v. Oceans Intl., 621 F.2d 207 (5th Cir.
1980), see Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. United States, 874 F.2d 169,
172-173 (3d Cir. 1989). Where Congress intends to overturn prior
law, it must do so in “clear, unmistakable, and unarguable
language.” United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1302 (10th
Cir. 1999). Conference committee reports are valuable in
determining if Congress intended to overturn prior law, Sea-Land
Serv., Inc. v. United States, supra; see United States v.
Edwards, 23 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1927).
Congress did not express any intention to overturn Standing,
Polk, and Reise, in the conference committee reports or elsewhere
in the legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (1986
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