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TRA), Pub. L. 99-514, sec. 501, 100 Stat. 2233. Standing, Polk,
and Reise, were based on statutory language which permitted a
deduction for interest if it arose “in carrying on a trade or
business” and “attributable to” the taxpayer’s trade or business.
See secs. 23(a)(1)(A), 22(n), and 122(d)(5) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939. The majority argues that this language is
different from the language “interest paid or accrued on
indebtedness incurred or continued in connection with the conduct
of a trade or business” and the Technical and Miscellaneous
Revenue Act of 1988 (1988 TAMRA), Pub. L. 100-647, sec.
1005(c)(4), 102 Stat. 3390, language, and because of this
difference, the sections have a different meaning.
In Russello, the Supreme Court analyzed the substantive
differences between the two provisions in question. Russello v.
United States, supra at 22-24 (examining the substantive changes
and history of 18 U.S.C. sec. 1963(a)(1) (1970), the Racketeer
Influenced Corrupt Organization statute). In Russello, the
Supreme Court determined that Congress expanded a provision
beyond its original scope. Id. The majority has not engaged in
such an analysis. Additionally, the Supreme Court was construing
language in the same statute in Russello; whereas, in the instant
case, there are several statutes in question.
Moreover, it is not necessarily clear that the pre-1986 TRA
language is substantively different from the 1986 TRA language
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